CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: WHAT ASSOCIATION?

In the last few years, financial scandals have followed one another. The importance of corporate governance (CG) has been accentuated. CG continues to be an area of importance, while earnings management (EM) continues to be a problematic issue. Although the judgment of EM varies from one author to another. Some judge it as opportunistic, which conceals the quality of financial communication, while others judge it as beneficial. In the light of agency theory this article aims to investigate the relationship between CG and the EM, although the judgment is not clearly definitive. The CG system stipulates to align the interests of the stakeholders, while limiting the agency problem. Various studies show that internal CG mechanisms are a tool to curb the practices of EM, and therefore improve financial disclosure and protection of investors and other stakeholders. On the other hand, the pressure of this system can lead to the aggressive use of this EM practice. We first discuss an explanation of EM from different perspectives, then move on to a definition of CG and then trace the relationship of CG and EM in the light of agency theory.